The traditional representations of games using the extensive form or the strategic (normal) form obscure much of the structure that is present in real-world games. In this paper, we propose a new representation language for general multiplayer games -multi-agent influence diagrams (MAIDs). This representation extends graphical models for probability distributions to a multi-agent decision-making context. MAIDs explicitly encode structure involving the dependence relationships among variables. As a consequence, we can define a notion of strategic relevance of one decision variable to another:
Introduction
Game theory [Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991] provides a mathematical framework for determining what behavior is rational for agents interacting with each other in a partially observable environment. However, the traditional representations of games are primarily designed to be amenable to abstract mathematical formulation and analysis. As a consequence, the standard game representations, both the normal (matrix) form and the extensive (game tree) form, obscure certain important structure that is often present in real-world scenarios -the decomposition of the situation into chance and decision variables, and the dependence relationships between these variables. In this paper, we provide a representation that captures this type of structure. We also show that capturing this structure explicitly has several advantages, both in our ability to analyze the game in novel ways, and in our ability to compute Nash equilibria efficiently.
Our framework of multi-agent influence diagrams (MAIDs) extends the formalisms of Bayesian networks (BNs) [Pearl, 1988] and influence diagrams [Howard and Matheson, 1984] to represent decision problems involving multiple agents.
MAIDs have clearly defined semantics as noncooperative games: a MAID can be reduced to an equivalent game tree, albeit at the cost of obscuring the variable-level interaction structure that the MAID makes explicit. MAIDs allow us to describe complex games using a natural representation, whose size is no larger than that of the extensive form, but which can be exponentially more compact.
Just as Bayesian networks make explicit the dependencies between probabilistic variables, MAIDs make explicit the dependencies between decision variables. They allow us to define a qualitative notion of strategic relevance: a decision variable £ strategically relies on another decision variable £ ¥ ¤ when, to optimize the decision rule at £ , the decisionmaking agent needs to take into consideration the decision rule at
£ ¥ ¤
. This notion provides new insight about the relationships between the agents' decisions in a strategic interaction. We provide a graph-based criterion, which we call sreachability, for determining strategic relevance based purely on the graph structure, and show that it is sound and complete in the same sense that d-separation is sound and complete for probabilistic dependence. We also provide a polynomial time algorithm for computing s-reachability.
The notion of strategic relevance allows us to define a data structure that we call the relevance graph -a directed graph that indicates when one decision variable in the MAID relies on another. We show that this data structure can be used to provide a natural decomposition of a complex game into interacting fragments, and provide an algorithm that finds equilibria for these smaller games in a way that is guaranteed to produce a global equilibrium for the entire game. We show that our algorithm can be exponentially more efficient than an application of standard game-theoretic solution algorithms, including the more efficient solution algorithms of [Romanovskii, 1962; Koller et al., 1994] that work directly on the game tree.
whether Alice has poisoned his tree, but he can tell if the tree is getting sick, and he has the option of calling in a tree doctor (at some cost). The attention of a tree doctor reduces the chance that the tree will die during the coming winter. Meanwhile, Alice must make a decision about building her patio before the weather gets too cold. When she makes this decision, she knows whether a tree doctor has come, but she cannot observe the health of the tree directly. A MAID for this scenario is shown in Fig. 1 . To define a MAID, we begin with a set of agents. The world in which the agents act is represented by the set . Chance variables correspond to decisions of nature, as in Bayesian networks [Pearl, 1988] 
where dom " £ a is the joint domain of " £ . Because the expectation of a sum of random variables is the same as the sum of the expectations of the individual random variables, we can also write this equation as:
Having defined the notion of an expected utility, we can now define what it means for an agent to optimize his decision at one or more of his decision rules, relative to a given set of decision rules for the other variables. r . In the game-theoretic framework, we typically consider a strategy profile to represent rational behavior if it is a Nash equilibrium [Nash, 1950] . Intuitively, a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if no agent has an incentive to deviate from the strategy specified for him by the profile, as long as the other agents do not deviate from their specified strategies. 
MAIDs and Games
A MAID provides a compact representation of a scenario that can also be represented as a game in strategic or extensive form. In this section, we discuss how to convert a MAID into an extensive-form game. We also show how, once we have found an equilibrium strategy profile for a MAID, we can convert it into a behavior strategy profile for the extensive form game. The word "node" in this section refers solely to a node in the tree, as distinguished from the nodes in the MAID.
We use a straightforward extension of a construction of [Pearl, 1988] for converting an influence diagram into a decision tree. The basic idea is to construct a tree with splits for decision and chance nodes in the MAID. However, to reduce the exponential blowup, we observe that we do not need to split on every chance variable in the MAID. A chance variable that is never observed by any decision can be eliminated by summing it out in the probability and utility computations. We present the construction below, referring the reader to [Pearl, 1988] for a complete discussion.
The set of variables included in our game tree is We define the payoffs at the leaves by computing a distribution over the utility nodes, given an instantiation of ¦ . For a leaf , the payoff for agent ¥ is:
We can also show that the value of (4) . The information sets in the game tree correspond one-to-one with these pairs, and a behavior strategy in the game tree is a mapping from information sets to probability distributions. Clearly the two are equivalent.
Based 
leaves. A MAID representation is not always more compact. If the game tree is naturally asymmetric, a naive MAID representation can be exponentially larger than the tree. We return to the problem of asymmetric scenarios in Section 6.
Strategic Relevance
To take advantage of the independence structure in a MAID, we would like to find a global equilibrium through a series of relatively simple local computations. The difficulty is that, in order to determine the optimal decision rule for a single decision variable, we usually need to know the decision rules for some other variables. In Example 1, when Alice is deciding whether to poison the tree, she needs to compare the expected utilities of her two alternatives. However, the probability of the tree dying depends on the probability of Bob calling a tree doctor if he observes that the tree is sick. Thus, we need to know the decision rule for CallTreeDoctor to determine the optimal decision rule for PoisonTree. In such situations, we will say that PoisonTree (strategically) relies on CallTreeDoctor, or that CallTreeDoctor is relevant to PoisonTree. On the other hand, CallTreeDoctor does not rely on PoisonTree. Bob gets to observe whether the tree is sick, and TreeDead is conditionally independent of PoisonTree given TreeSick, so the decision rule for PoisonTree is not relevant to Bob's decision.
We will now formalize this intuitive discussion of strategic . The last clause of this definition is needed to deal with a problem that arises in many other places in game theory -the problem of suboptimal decisions in response to observations that have zero probability (such as observing an irrational move by another agent).
Relevance is a numeric criterion that depends on the specific probabilities and utilities in the MAID. It is not obvious how we would check for strategic relevance without testing all possible pairs of strategy profiles g and g¤ . We would like to find a qualitative criterion which can help us determine strategic relevance purely from the structure of the graph. In other words, we would like to find a criterion which is analogous to the d-separation criterion for determining conditional independence in Bayesian networks.
First, the optimality of the decision rule at £ only if it can influence the probability distribution over the utility nodes § . To determine whether the CPD for a node can affect the probability distribution over a set of other nodes, we can build on a graphical criterion already defined for Bayesian networks, that of a requisite probability node: We can show that s-reachability is sound and complete for strategic relevance (almost) in the same sense that d-separation is sound and complete for independence in Bayesian networks. As for d-separation, the soundness result is very strong: without s-reachability, one decision cannot be relevant to another. . As for BNs, the result is not as strong in the other direction: s-reachability does not imply relevance in every MAID. We can choose the probabilities and utilities in the MAID in such a way that the influence of one decision rule on another does not manifest itself. However, s-reachability is the most precise graphical criterion we can use: it will not identify a strategic relevance unless that relevance actually exists in some MAID that has the given graph structure. We say that two MAIDs have the same graph structure when the two MAIDs have the same sets of variables and agents, each variable has the same parents in the two MAIDs, and the assignment of decision and utility variables to agents is the same in both MAIDs. The chance and decision variables must have the same domains in both MAIDs, but we allow the actual utility values of the utility variables (their domains) to vary. The CPDs in the two MAIDS may also be different. Fig. 4(a) 
Theorem 2 (Completeness) If a node

£
. Although we now have a graph-theoretic characterization of strategic relevance, it will be helpful to develop some intuition by examining some simple MAIDs, and seeing when one decision node relies on another. In the five examples shown in Fig. 3 , the decision node 
. Thus, the relevance graph is cyclic. In (d), however, the relevance graph is acyclic despite the fact that the agents move simultaneously. The difference here is that agent 
Computing Equilibria
The computation of a Nash equilibrium for a game is arguably the key computational task in game theory. In this section, we show how the structure of the MAID can be exploited to provide efficient algorithms for finding equilibria in certain games. The key insight behind our algorithm is the use of the relevance graph to break up the task of finding an equilibrium into a series of subtasks, each over a much smaller game. Since algorithms for finding equilibria in general games have complexity that is superlinear in the number of levels in the game tree, breaking the game into smaller games significantly improves the complexity of finding a global equilibrium.
Our algorithm is a generalization of existing backward induction algorithms for decision trees and perfect information games [Zermelo, 1913] and for influence diagrams [Jensen et al., 1994] . The basic idea is as follows: in order to optimize the decision rule for £ , we need to know the decision rule for all decisions £ ¤ that are relevant for £ . For example, the relevance graph for the Tree Killer example (Fig. 4(a) ) shows that to optimize PoisonTree, we must first decide on the decision rules for BuildPatio and TreeDoctor. However, we can optimize TreeDoctor without knowing the decision rules for either of the other decision variables. Having decided on the decision rule for TreeDoctor, we can now optimize BuildPatio and then finally PoisonTree. , deriving an optimal decision rule for each decision node in turn. Each decision £ relies only on the decisions that succeed it in the order, and these will have been computed by the time we have to select the decision rule for £ . The relevance graph is acyclic in all perfect-information games, and in all single-agent decision problems with perfect recall. There are also some games of imperfect information, such as the Tree Killer example, that have acyclic relevance graphs. But in most games we will encounter cycles in the relevance graph. Consider, for example, any simple twoplayer simultaneous move game with two decisions £ f l and £ ¤ , where both players' payoffs depend on the decisions at both £ l and £ ¤ , as in Fig. 3(c) . In this case, the optimality of one player's decision rule is clearly intertwined with the other player's choice of decision rule, and the two decision rules must "match" in order to be in equilibrium. Indeed, as we discussed, the relevance graph in such a situation is cyclic.
However, we can often utilize relevance structure even in games where the relevance graph is cyclic. Example 3 Consider the relevance graph for the Road example, shown in Fig. 4(b) Intuitively, although the last pair of nodes in the relevance graph rely on each other, they rely on nothing else. Hence, we can compute an equilibrium for the pair together, regardless of any other decision rules. Once we have computed an equilibrium for this last pair, the decision variables can be treated as chance nodes, and we can proceed to compute an equilibrium for the next pair.
We formalize this intuition in the following definition: Fig. 4(b) .
We can find the maximal SCCs of a relevance graph in linear time, by constructing a component graph whose nodes are the maximal SCCs of the graph [Cormen et al., 1990] . There is an edge from component The algorithm iterates backwards over the SCC's, finding an equilibrium strategy profile for each SCC in the MAID induced by the previously selected decision rules (with arbitrary decision rules for some decisions that are not relevant for this SCC). In this induced MAID, the only remaining decision nodes are those in the current SCC; all the other decision nodes have been converted to chance nodes. Finding the equilibrium in this induced MAID requires the use of a subroutine for finding equilibria in games. We simply convert the induced MAID into a game tree, as described in Section 3, and use a standard game-solving algorithm [McKelvey and McLennan, 1996] as a subroutine. Note that if the relevance graph is acyclic, each SCC consists of a single decision node. Thus, step 3 involves finding a Nash equilbrium in a singleplayer game, which reduces to simply finding a decision rule that maximizes the single agent's expected utility.
In proving the correctness of Algorithm 1, we encounter a subtle technical difficulty. The definition of strategic relevance (Def. 5) only deals with the optimality of a single decision rule for a strategy profile. But in Algorithm 1, we derive not just single decision rules, but a complete strategy for each agent. To make the leap from the optimality of single decision rules to the optimality of whole strategies in our proof, we must make the standard assumption of perfect recallthat agents never forget their previous actions or observations. More formally:
Definition 10 An agent ¥ has perfect recall with respect to a total order
We can now prove the correctness of Algorithm 1. To demonstrate the potential savings resulting from our algorithm, we tried it on the Road example, for different numbers of agents $ . Note that the model we used differs slightly from that shown in Fig. 2 : In our experiments, each agent had not just one utility node, but a separate utility node for each neighboring plot of land, and an additional node that depends on the suitability of the plot for different purposes. The agent's decision node is a parent of all these utility nodes. The idea is that an agent gets some base payoff for the building he builds, and then the neighboring plots and the suitability node apply additive bonuses and penalties to his payoff. Thus, instead of having one utility node with This change has no effect on the structure of the relevance graph, which is shown for $ c in Fig. 4(b) . The SCCs in the relevance graph all have size 2; as we discussed, they correspond to pairs of decisions about plots that are across the road from each other.
Even for small values of $ , it is infeasible to solve the Road example with standard game-solving algorithms. As we discussed, the game tree for the MAID has £ ( ¤¦ leaves, whereas the MAID representation is linear in $ . The normal form adds another exponential factor. Since each agent (except the first two) can observe three ternary variables, he has 27 information sets. Hence, the number of possible pure (deterministic) 
Discussion and Future Work
We have introduced a new formalism, multi-agent influence diagrams (MAIDs), for modeling multi-agent scenarios with imperfect information. MAIDs use a representation where variables are the basic unit, and allow the dependencies between these variables to be represented explicitly, in a graphical form. They therefore reveal important qualitative structure in a game, which can be useful both for understanding the game and as the basis for algorithms that find equilibria efficiently. In particular, we have shown that our divide-andconquer algorithm for finding equilibria provides exponential savings over existing solution algorithms in some cases, such as the Road example, where the maximal size of an SCC in the relevance graph is much smaller than the total number of decision variables. In the worst case, the relevance graph forms a single large SCC, and our algorithm simply solves the game in its entirety, with no computational benefits.
Although the possibility of extending influence diagrams to multi-agent scenarios was recognized at least fifteen years ago [Shachter, 1986] , the idea seems to have been dormant for some time. Suryadi and Gmytrasiewicz [1999] have used influence diagrams as a framework for learning in multi-agent systems. Milch and Koller [2000] use multi-agent influence diagrams as a representational framework for reasoning about agents' beliefs and decisions. However, the focus of both these papers is very different, and they do not consider the structural properties of the influence diagram representation, nor the computational benefits derived from it. Nilsson and Lauritzen [2000] have done related work on limited memory influence diagrams, but they focus on the task of speeding up inference in single-agent settings. MAIDs are also related to La Mura's [2000] game networks, which incorporate both probabilistic and utility independence. La Mura defines a notion of strategic independence, and also uses it to break up the game into separate components. However, his notion of strategic independence is an undirected one, and thus does not allow as fine-grained a decomposition as the directed relevance graph used in this paper, nor the use of a backward induction process for interacting decisions.
This work opens the door to a variety of possible extensions. On the representational front, it is important to extend MAIDs to deal with asymmetric situations, where the decisions to be made and the information available depend on previous decisions or chance moves. Game trees represent such asymmetry in a natural way, whereas in MAIDs (as in influence diagrams and BNs), a naive representation of an asymmetric situation leads to unnecessary blowup. We believe we can avoid these difficulties in MAIDs by explicitly representing context-specificity, as in [Boutilier et al., 1996; Smith et al., 1993] , integrating the best of the game tree and MAID representations.
Another direction relates to additional structure that is revealed by the notion of strategic relevance. In particular, even if a group of nodes forms an SCC in the relevance graph, it might not be a fully connected subgraph; for example, we might have a situation where Finally, the notion of strategic relevance is not the only type of insight that we can obtain from the MAID representation. We can use a similar type of path-based analysis in the MAID graph to determine which of the variables that an agent can observe before making a decision actually provide relevant information for that decision. In complex scenarios, especially those that are extended over time, agents tend to accumulate a great many observations. The amount of space needed to specify a decision rule for the current decision increases exponentially with the number of observed variables. Thus, there has been considerable work on identifying irrelevant parents of decision nodes in single-agent influence diagrams [Howard and Matheson, 1984; Shachter, 1990; 1998 ]. However, the multi-agent case raises subtleties that are absent in the single-agent case. This is another problem we plan to address in future work.
